Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xviii

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2. Welfare and Property Relations

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. Informational Rents and Property Rights in Land

      • Dilip Mookherjee

      Pages 3-42

   3. An Efficiency Argument for Sustainable Use

      • Joaquim Silvestre

      Pages 43-68

   4. Full Employment as a Worker-Discipline Device

      • Karl Ove Moene, Michael Wallerstein

      Pages 69-93

   5. Transferability of Collective Property Rights: Does Trade Destroy Trust?

      • Paul Seabright

      Pages 94-115

   6. Limited Privatization in the Presence of Public Bads

      • John E. Roemer

      Pages 116-144

3. Finance And Control

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 145-145

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   2. Corporate Governance, Financial Systems and the Transition to Capitalism: Towards a Conceptual Framework

      • Erik Berglöf

      Pages 147-170

   3. Long-Term Investment and Monitoring in Financial Relationships

      • Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

      Pages 171-193

   4. Alternative Models of Control: Efficiency, Accessibility and Market Failures

      • Fabrizio Barca

      Pages 194-215

4. Distribution and the Type of Firm

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 217-217

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   2. Employment Contracts, Finance and the Distribution of Wealth

      • A. F. Newman

      Pages 219-242

   3. Democratic Firms and the Distribution of Wealth

      • Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis

      Pages 243-267

5. Transition to the Market

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 269-269

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   2. The Economics of Enterprise Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe

      • Philippe Aghion, Olivier Jean Blanchard, Wendy Carlin

      Pages 271-325

   3. Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives

      • Martin L. Weitzman, Chenggang Xu

      Pages 326-355

6. Democracy and Distribution

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 357-357

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   2. Why Have the Rabble not Redistributed the Wealth? On the Stability of Democracy and Unequal Property

      • Louis Putterman

      Pages 359-393

7. Back Matter

   Pages 395-408

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The dramatic implosions of the centrally administered, non-democratic political systems in central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s have generated a body of research concerning the transition from public ownership, and the role of the market and other institutions in engendering good incentives for economic actors. The essays collected in this volume study property relations, their associated incentives and the consequent effects on welfare: the ubiquitous theme is that efficiency cannot be divorced from the distribution of productive assets.

• capitalism
• corporate governance
• democracy
• Distribution
• economics
• employment
• gender
• governance
• Institution
• Investment
• restructuring
• trade
• trust

• University of California, Davis, USA

  John E. Roemer

JOHN E. ROEMER is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Davis, where he is also Director of the Program on Economy, Justice and Society. He is the author of over 90 academic articles and eight books including Egalitarian Perspectives: Essays in Philosphical Economics and A Future for Socialism. Roemer is on the board of several academic journals, and is associate editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the Journal of Economic Literature and Economic Design. He has been a Fellow of the Econometric Society since 1986.

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