Britain’s War in the Middle East

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xii

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2. Introduction

   • Martin Kolinsky

   Pages 1-16

3. British Strategic Policy, 1936–8

   • Martin Kolinsky

   Pages 17-31

4. Political Uncertainties in Egypt during the Interwar Period

   • Martin Kolinsky

   Pages 32-47

5. Palestine 1936–8: the Reshaping of British Policy

   • Martin Kolinsky

   Pages 48-69

6. The Policy of Appeasement: the White Paper on Palestine and Jewish Refugees

   • Martin Kolinsky

   Pages 70-92

7. British Strategic Policy, 1939–June 1940

   • Martin Kolinsky

   Pages 93-121

8. Defence Issues in Egypt and Palestine, 1939–40

   • Martin Kolinsky

   Pages 122-144

9. British Strategic Policy, July 1940–June 1941

   • Martin Kolinsky

   Pages 145-169

10. British Intervention in Egyptian Politics

    • Martin Kolinsky

    Pages 170-187

11. Wartime Policy towards Palestine

    • Martin Kolinsky

    Pages 188-206

12. Conclusion

    • Martin Kolinsky

    Pages 207-219

13. Back Matter

    Pages 220-308

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During the early years of the Second World War, Britain devoted immense resources to building military bases in Egypt and Palestine. The political stability of the two countries was of prime concern to avoid diverting troops away from fighting the external enemy to internal security tasks. The paradox of Britain's eventual victory was that it could not perpetuate its political authority. Demands for independence intensified in Egypt and among Palestinian Jewry, and led to postwar struggles.

• bibliography
• Diplomacy
• Middle East

This is an informative book that usefully defines British military dilemmas in Middle Eastern conditions... American Historical Review

• Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, UK

  Martin Kolinsky

Martin Kolinsky is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham.

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