Authors:
Provides up to date examples and case studies to help illustrate the arguments
Describes the standard model of the firm before providing a critique of the three main premises on which the model is based
Describes a modified design-framework for executive pay plans based on recent developments in behavioural science
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Table of contents (6 chapters)
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Front Matter
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Back Matter
About this book
This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.
Authors and Affiliations
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Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
Alexander Pepper
About the author
Alexander Pepper is Professor of Management Practice at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. He previously had a long career at PwC, where he was a global leader of PwC’s Human Resource Services consulting practice from 2002-2006. He has authored two books, Senior Executive Reward (2006), and The Economic Psychology of Incentives published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2015.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Agency Theory and Executive Pay
Book Subtitle: The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma
Authors: Alexander Pepper
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99969-2
Publisher: Palgrave Pivot Cham
eBook Packages: Business and Management, Business and Management (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2019
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-319-99968-5Published: 29 November 2018
eBook ISBN: 978-3-319-99969-2Published: 19 November 2018
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XI, 133
Number of Illustrations: 8 b/w illustrations
Topics: Corporate Governance, Human Resource Management, Organization, Behavioral Sciences