Sovereign Debt Crises and Negotiations in Brazil and Mexico, 1888-1914

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xx

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2. Governments versus Bankers

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. Introduction

      • Leonardo Weller

      Pages 3-20

   3. Governments versus Bankers in the Pre-1914 Sovereign Debt Market

      • Leonardo Weller

      Pages 21-39

3. Brazil versus Rothschilds

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 41-41

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   2. Rothschilds’ Tropical Empire: Brazil, 1822–1889

      • Leonardo Weller

      Pages 43-58

   3. Rothschilds’ Troubled Republic: Brazil, 1889–1898

      • Leonardo Weller

      Pages 59-82

   4. Rothschilds and Coffee Finance: Brazil, 1898–1914

      • Leonardo Weller

      Pages 83-102

4. Mexico versus Mediocre Banks

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 103-103

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   2. From Defaults to Redemption: Mexico, 1821–1890

      • Leonardo Weller

      Pages 105-126

   3. The Bankers’ Beloved Dictatorship: Mexico, 1890–1910

      • Leonardo Weller

      Pages 127-146

   4. The Loans of the Revolution: Mexico, 1911–1914

      • Leonardo Weller

      Pages 147-162

   5. Conclusion

      • Leonardo Weller

      Pages 163-167

5. Back Matter

   Pages 169-183

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This book analyzes the relative balance of bargaining power between governments and the banks in charge of underwriting their debt during the first financial globalization. Brazil and Mexico, both indebted countries that underwent major changes in reputation and negotiating power as they faced financial crises, provide valuable case studies of government strategies for obtaining the best possible outcomes. Previous literature has focused on bankers’ perspectives and emphasized that debtors were submissive during negotiations, but Weller finds that governments’ negotiating power varied over time. He presents a new analytical framework that interprets when and why officials were likely to negotiate loans more or less effectively, with newly uncovered primary sources from debtors’ and creditors’ archives suggesting key causes of variation: fiscal accounts, political stability, and creditors’ exposure and reputation. 

• international finance
• latin america
• stabilization
• Rothschilds
• financial crisis
• public finance
• Brazil
• Mexico
• Banking
• financial history

• São Paulo School of Economics—FGV, São Paulo, Brazil

  Leonardo Weller

Leonardo Weller is Lecturer at the São Paulo School of Economics, Fundação Getulio Vargas, (EESP-FGV), Brazil. He earned his PhD at the London School of Economics, UK.

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