Overview
- Divides and discusses visual perception in terms of 'early vision' and the often overlooked perceptual stage of 'late vision'
- Provides an account of how cognitive states could affect perceptual states in a way that entails late vision is cognitive penetrability
- Approaches problems using a unique perspective in which empirical studies and philosophical analysis are interwoven
Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy (PIIP)
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Table of contents (5 chapters)
Keywords
About this book
The book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neither is it affected directly by cognition, nor does cognition affect its epistemic role.
It also argues that late vision, even though it is cognitively penetrated and, thus, affected by concepts, is still a perceptual state that does not involve any discursive inferences and does not belong to the space of reasons. Finally, an account is given as to how cognitive states with symbolic content could affect perceptual states with iconic, analog content, during late vision.
Authors and Affiliations
About the author
He has been a fellow at the Center for Philosophy and History of science at Pittsburgh University, USA, and has published more than 130 papers and books in philosophy of science, philosophy of perception, philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Cognitive Penetrability and the Epistemic Role of Perception
Authors: Athanassios Raftopoulos
Series Title: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10445-0
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan Cham
eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-030-10444-3Published: 15 March 2019
eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-10445-0Published: 07 February 2019
Series ISSN: 2946-2851
Series E-ISSN: 2946-286X
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XIX, 368
Number of Illustrations: 2 b/w illustrations
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind