The author attempts to show that scientific realism is compatible with the presence of idealization in the sciences. His main contention is that idealized theories can be treated as counterfactuals about how things are in worlds that are similar to but simpler than the actual world.

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Authors and Affiliations

St. Cloud State University, USA

Michael J. Shaffer

About the author

MICHAEL SHAFFER is Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Cloud State University, USA. He is the author of The Experimental Turn and the Methods of Philosophy, co-editor of What Place for the A Priori? and has published many articles about epistemology, logic and the philosophy of science.

Bibliographic Information

Book Title: Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism
Authors: Michael J. Shaffer
Series Title: New Directions in the Philosophy of Science
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137271587
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan London
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy Collection, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2012
Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-230-30845-9Published: 13 August 2012
Softcover ISBN: 978-1-349-33906-8Published: 01 January 2012
eBook ISBN: 978-1-137-27158-7Published: 13 August 2012
Series ISSN: 2947-6828
Series E-ISSN: 2947-6836
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XI, 209
Topics: Philosophy of Science, Epistemology, Logic

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Table of contents (5 chapters)

Front Matter

Introduction

The Concept of Idealization

The Ubiquity of Idealization and Its Logic

Epistemic Access, Confirmation, and Idealization

Idealization, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Scientific Realism

Back Matter

About this book