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United States Army Doctrine

Adapting to Political Change

Palgrave Macmillan
  • This work examines that impact that domestic, international, and bureaucratic politics had on four significant shifts in United States Army doctrine between 1954 and 2008

  • This study shows that although the US Army strives to remain largely apolitical as an institution, it cannot completely escape, nor is it completely immune, from the impact of politics

  • An understanding of how politics has impacted the Army in the past, can help Army leaders understand the impact that politics may have in the future

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Table of contents (6 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xi
  2. Introduction

    • David C. Rasmussen
    Pages 1-34
  3. 1954 Case Study

    • David C. Rasmussen
    Pages 35-62
  4. 1962 Case Study

    • David C. Rasmussen
    Pages 63-82
  5. 1976 Case Study

    • David C. Rasmussen
    Pages 83-108
  6. 2008 Case Study

    • David C. Rasmussen
    Pages 109-132
  7. Conclusion

    • David C. Rasmussen
    Pages 133-141
  8. Back Matter

    Pages 143-144

About this book

This book argues that the US Army has made four significant shifts in the content of its capstone operations doctrine along a spectrum of war since the end of WWII: 1) in 1954 it made a shift from a doctrine focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare to a doctrine that added significant emphasis to high-intensity nuclear warfare; 2) in 1962 it made an even greater shift in the opposite direction toward low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine; 3) in 1976 it shifted back to an almost exclusive focus on mid-intensity conventional warfare content; 4) and this is where Army doctrine remained for 32 years until 2008, when it made a doctrinal shift back toward low-intensity unconventional warfare – five and seven years into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. Closely tracking each of these shifts, the author zooms in on specific domestic, international and bureaucratic politics that had a direct impact on these shifts.

Authors and Affiliations

  • US Army Garrison, Installation Management Command, West Point, USA

    David C. Rasmussen

About the author

Dr. David C. Rasmussen is a retired US Army Infantry Lieutenant Colonel. He earned his PhD in political science from the City University of New York Graduate Center in 2018. He has been a visiting professor for Ashford University, Queens College, and the State University of New York at New Paltz. Dr. Rasmussen currently works as a Department of the Army Civilian planning specialist for the US Army Installation Management Command, in the Garrison Directorate of Plans, Operations, Training, and Security at the US Military Academy, West Point, NY.

Bibliographic Information

Buy it now

Buying options

eBook USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access