Editors:
Includes a new and unpublished essay by John R. Searle
Examines the Is/Ought question from the standpoints of semantics, pragmatics, the theory of constitutive rules, and legal theory
Provides an in-depth exploration of the puzzles raised by Searle's chapter by leading international scholars
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Table of contents (15 chapters)
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Front Matter
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Part I
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Front Matter
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Part II
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Front Matter
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Back Matter
About this book
This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle’s 1964 article How to Derive "Ought " from "Is’’ sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is" - it simply follows that you "ought" to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein’s philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action.
The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle’s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought".
Editors and Affiliations
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University of Milan, Milan, Italy
Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi
About the editors
Paolo Di Lucia is Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. His research interests include the philosophy of normative language, social ontology, and philosophy of justice. His previous publications include Deontica in von Wright (1992), L’universale della promessa (1997), and Normatività. Diritto linguaggio azione (2003, Spanish translation 2009).
Edoardo Fittipaldi is Professor of Sociology of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. His research interests include the epistemology of social sciences, legal realisms, and social ontology. Among his books are Scienza del diritto e razionalismo critico. Il programma epistemologico di Hans Albert per la scienza e sociologia del diritto (2003) and Everyday Legal Ontology (2012).
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"
Editors: Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan Cham
eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-030-54115-6Published: 17 February 2021
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-030-54118-7Published: 17 February 2022
eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-54116-3Published: 16 February 2021
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XXVII, 344
Number of Illustrations: 2 b/w illustrations
Topics: Ethics, Philosophy of Language