Action, Perception and the Brain

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xiii

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • Jay Schulkin

   Pages 1-24

3. The Slow Process: A Hypothetical Cognitive Adaptation for Distributed Cognitive Networks

   • Merlin Donald

   Pages 25-42

4. Social Cognition and Cortical Function

   • Susanne Shultz, Robin IM Dunbar

   Pages 43-67

5. Homo Heuristicus and the Bias–Variance Dilemma

   • Henry Brighton, Gerd Gigerenzer

   Pages 68-91

6. Action, Embodied Meaning, and Thought

   • Mark Johnson

   Pages 92-116

7. Neo-Pragmatism and Enactive Intentionality

   • Shaun Gallagher, Katsunori Miyahara

   Pages 117-146

8. Minds, Things, and Materiality

   • Michael Wheeler

   Pages 147-163

9. Contributions of Mirror Mechanisms to the Embodiment of Cognition

   • Arthur M. Glenberg

   Pages 164-189

10. The Neural Systems Involved in Motor Cognition and Social Contact

    • Sébastien Hétu, Philip L. Jackson

    Pages 190-217

11. Action and Cephalic Expression: Hermeneutical Pragmatism

    • Jay Schulkin, Patrick Heelan

    Pages 218-258

12. Back Matter

    Pages 259-272

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Theories of brain evolution stress communication and sociality are essential to our capacity to represent objects as intersubjectively accessible. How did we grow as a species to be able to recognize objects as common, as that which can also be seen in much the same way by others? Such constitution of intersubjectively accessible objects is bound up with our flexible and sophisticated capacities for social cognition understanding others and their desires, intentions, emotions, and moods which are crucial to the way human beings live. This book is about contemporary philosophical and neuroscientific perspectives on the relation of action, perception, and cognition as it is lived in embodied and socially embedded experience. This emphasis on embodiment and embeddedness is a change from traditional theories, which focused on isolated, representational, and conceptual cognition. In the new perspectives contained in our book, such 'pure' cognition is thought to be under-girded and interpenetrated by embodied and embedded processes.

• action
• cognition
• Embodiment
• perception

• Georgetown University, USA

  Jay Schulkin

HENRY BRIGHTON Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Germany MERLIN DONALD Department of Psychology, Queens University, Canada ROBIN I.M.DUNBAR Department of Evolutionary Anthropology, Oxford University, UK SHAUN GALLAGHER Department of Philosophy, University of South Florida, USA GERD GIGERENZER Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Germany ARTHUR M.GLENBERG Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, USA PATRICK HEELAN Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, USA SÉBASTIEN HÉTU Department of Psychology, University of Laval, Canada PHILIP L.JACKSON Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, USA MARK JOHNSON Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, USA KATSUNORI MIYAHARA Department of Philosophy, University of South Florida, USA SUSANNE SHULTZ Department of Evolutionary Anthropology, Oxford University, UK MICHAEL WHEELER Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, UK

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