Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"

Editors: Di Lucia, Paolo, Fittipaldi, Edoardo (Eds.)

Free Preview
  • Includes a new and unpublished essay by John R. Searle
  • Examines the Is/Ought question from the standpoints of semantics, pragmatics, the theory of constitutive rules, and legal theory
  • Provides an in-depth exploration of the puzzles raised by Searle's chapter by leading international scholars
see more benefits

Buy this book

eBook $109.00
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-030-54116-3
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: EPUB, PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $139.99
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-030-54115-6
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Institutional customers should get in touch with their account manager
  • Covid-19 shipping restrictions & severe weather in the US may cause delays
  • Usually ready to be dispatched within 3 to 5 business days, if in stock
About this book

This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle’s 1964 article How to Derive "Ought " from "Is’’ sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is" - it simply follows that you "ought" to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein’s philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action.  

The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle’s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law.  With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought".  


About the authors

Paolo Di Lucia is Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. His research interests include the philosophy of normative language, social ontology, and philosophy of justice. His previous publications include Deontica in von Wright (1992), L’universale della promessa (1997), and Normatività. Diritto linguaggio azione (2003, Spanish translation 2009).

Edoardo Fittipaldi is Professor of Sociology of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. His research interests include the epistemology of social sciences, legal realisms, and social ontology. Among his books are Scienza del diritto e razionalismo critico. Il programma epistemologico di Hans Albert per la scienza e sociologia del diritto (2003) and Everyday Legal Ontology (2012).


Table of contents (15 chapters)

Table of contents (15 chapters)

Buy this book

eBook $109.00
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-030-54116-3
  • Digitally watermarked, DRM-free
  • Included format: EPUB, PDF
  • ebooks can be used on all reading devices
  • Immediate eBook download after purchase
Hardcover $139.99
price for USA
  • ISBN 978-3-030-54115-6
  • Free shipping for individuals worldwide
  • Institutional customers should get in touch with their account manager
  • Covid-19 shipping restrictions & severe weather in the US may cause delays
  • Usually ready to be dispatched within 3 to 5 business days, if in stock

Services for this book

Loading...

Bibliographic Information

Bibliographic Information
Book Title
Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"
Editors
  • Paolo Di Lucia
  • Edoardo Fittipaldi
Copyright
2021
Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan
Copyright Holder
The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s)
eBook ISBN
978-3-030-54116-3
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3
Hardcover ISBN
978-3-030-54115-6
Edition Number
1
Number of Pages
XXVII, 344
Number of Illustrations
2 b/w illustrations
Topics